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Abstract—There is ongoing interest in utilising user expe-
riences associated with security and privacy to better inform
system design and development. However, there are few studies
demonstrating how, together, security and usability design tech-
niques can help in the design of secure systems; such studies
provide practical examples and lessons learned that practitioners
and researchers can use to inform best practice, and underpin
future research. This paper describes a three-year study where
security and usability techniques were used in a research and
development project to develop webinos — a secure, cross-
platform software environment for web applications. Because they
value innovation over both security and usability, research and
development projects are a particularly difficult context of study.
We describe the difficulties faced in applying these security and
usability techniques, the approaches taken to overcome them, and
lessons that can be learned by others trying to build usability and
security into software systems.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The security community has long recognised the need for
incorporating a human dimension into its work. Surprisingly,
however, while understanding how to design for user experi-
ence has been recognised as an important area for study, there
has been comparatively little work examining the practical
activities associated with building usable and secure systems.
This observation was highlighted by Birge [2], who noted
that there has been considerable research in Human-Computer
Interaction and Security (HCISec) in recent years, but the bulk
of this work has pertained to studying the usability of security
controls and conceptual investigations about terms such as
‘trust’ and ‘privacy’, rather than activities associated with
designing systems. In particular, much of this research focuses
on the needs of end-users, rather than those of designers —
few studies have attempted to tackle the question of how the
latter should approach both usability and security as design
concerns. At a NIST-hosted event on aligning software and
usable security with engineering in 2011 [15], several recom-
mendations for progressing the state-of-the-art were proposed,
with one being that more case studies demonstrating the
efficacy of best practice should be published. By showing
how techniques were (or were not) applied successfully in
contemporary design situations, practitioners could be better
informed when selecting approaches for their own projects,
while researchers could better understand the problems faced
and develop research agendas for dealing with them.
An interesting source of case studies comes from collab-
orative research and development (R&D) projects with teams
drawn from both industry and academia. The importance of
security has been recognised in recent years, partly due to
a number of high-profile incidents reported in the media.
Exploring the security and privacy implications of planned
innovations is now a common pre-requisite for the funding of
R&D projects. Unfortunately, designing a project for security
and usability is easier said than done. In many conventional
projects, security and usability are not considered primary
goals, making them likely candidates for sacrifice in the rush
to meet project deadlines. Unlike most conventional projects,
however, R&D projects usually tackle risky, ill-defined prob-
lems with the aim of achieving the greatest possible impact.
But impact can mean different things to different people: indus-
trial partners measure success by developing technology which
promises to be commercially successful, whereas academic
partners might use the technology to explore research questions
that surface during development. This apparent conflict can
mean that, when facing impending deadlines, different partners
have different priorities and areas of interest. Because this can
further undermine quality concerns such as security, usability,
or performance, creative solutions to design problems need to
be explored to account for potential conflict.
This paper describes the challenges faced designing se-
curity and usability into webinos: a software environment
for running web applications securely across different device
platforms. We begin in Section II by reviewing the issues faced
in projects where the primary aims are to innovate, as well as
the experiences of the HCISec community in contending with
both security and usability during such projects. In Section
III, we then present the webinos project and its objectives, the
design approach taken to develop the webinos platform, and
the part played by security and usability design techniques. We
describe the difficulties faced in applying these techniques in
Section IV, together with the approaches taken to tackle them.
Finally, in Section V, we reflect on lessons for those looking
to align security and usability design in projects of this nature.
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II. RELATED WORK
A. Innovation design in EU research projects
Designing for innovation might appear to be synonymous
with general information system design, but several differences
have been identified between the roles played by system
architects and entrepreneurs [9] in conventional and innovation
design respectively. The most prominent of these differences
is that architects are system-centered and their architectures
are realisations of system goals, whereas entrepreneurs are
opportunity-centered, such that their architectures fit into an
innovation strategy. This distinction is important: while archi-
tectural design is concerned with shaping an architecture to fit
a socio-technical environment, innovation is equally concerned
with shaping the socio-technical environment around the archi-
tecture. Because of this difference in perspectives, designing
for innovation is often hampered by what has been described
as the innovation design dilemma [14]: structured processes
(such as those typically associated with secure system design)
generate few ideas, while more unstructured processes generate
more diversity – but at the cost of conflict that may hamper
the implementation of innovation.
The priority of innovation over system design qualities
is evident when considering the role usability has played in
several European security and privacy projects. The PrimeLife
project [22] demonstrated how privacy technologies can enable
people to control their on-line personal information based
on their legal rights. Based on their experience developing a
number of Privacy Enhancing Technology (PET) exemplars,
the PrimeLife team identified several useful heuristics and
idioms when designing and evaluating user interfaces for PETs.
Usability researchers played an important role in evaluating
PrimeLife, but there is less evidence of their influence in the
design of the exemplars themselves. Representations of users
were created during the project to guide design decisions.
However, in an example of privacy in social software [3],
one of these representations is used only to illustrate access
control policies in web forums, rather than describing how it
influenced design decisions. While it is possible that these rep-
resentations were used to inform architectural and application
design, this is not reported.
B. Security and Usability Design
While the need for usable security had long been recog-
nised, the work of Zurko and Simon on user-centered security
— security models, mechanisms, systems and software having
usability as a primary motivation or goal — was one of the first
acknowledgements of the part designers can play in achieving
this [37]. As well as reinforcing the need for security models
that are sensitive to the mental models of different types of
users, they propose combining security design techniques with
established design techniques from HCI. Work by Sasse et al.
[25] has illustrated how such usability design approaches can
be applied to the design of security mechanisms. Based on the
empirical findings from several studies about password usage,
they found that framing the design of security controls from
technology, user, goal, task, and context perspectives can lead
to useful insights. Considering security as an enabling task that
needs to be completed before a main task begins explains why
users choose to circumvent controls getting in the way of their
work.
Although the work of Sasse et al. and Zurko and Simon
continues to inspire HCISec research, much of this com-
munity’s work focuses on studying the usability of security
controls and interfaces rather than activities associated with de-
signing interactive secure systems. Birge [2], in outlining five
broad categories of research in HCISec, observed that the only
one that mentions design is the ‘Usability and Design Studies’
category: exploring how traditional usability methods can be
used to make decisions about user interfaces with security or
privacy implications. In light of the lack of published work il-
lustrating how usable and secure systems might be designed, a
workshop was held in 2011 to explore whether it was possible
to blend security, usability and software engineering lifecycles
[15], with a number of informal anecdotes about promoting
usability design during secure software development being
discussed. Case studies exploring such insights are valuable,
but still in short supply.
C. Lessons learned from e-Science and NeuroGrid
Some problems faced by R&D projects have already been
encountered by the e-Science community, which is concerned
with building IT infrastructures that facilitate global scientific
collaboration. e-Science projects need to address two chal-
lenges relating to usable security design. First, global collabo-
ration entails building coalitions and working partnerships be-
tween stakeholders who are distributed and culturally diverse.
Cultural differences can lead the same artifacts in the same
apparent context of use being perceived and used in different
ways based on the norms and values of different scientific
communities [8]. Distributed stakeholders also means that
carrying out formative evaluation activities to glean and reason
about these differences can be expensive and time-consuming.
Second, security is not usually treated as a priority when
attempting to cast light on scientific uncertainties. Prioritising
core functionality does not mean that security is ignored in
e-Science, but, as is suggested in [17], there is a tendency
to treat design for security in an ad-hoc manner. Given the
different perceptions stakeholders might hold about assets in
an e-Science project, security design decisions might be ill-
suited to the assets needing protection. For example, some
stakeholders may not believe highly aggregated data sources
to be a valuable target for an attacker; however, with the right
search criteria, they could be de-anonymised to the detriment
of another stakeholder.
The NeuroGrid project is a useful exemplar of the impli-
cations of usability and security in the design of e-Science
projects. This project is also the subject of one of the few
published studies describing the application of security and
usability practices in e-Science projects [30]. NeuroGrid was a
three-year project funded by the UK Medical Research Council
to develop a Grid-based collaborative research environment;
this was designed to enhance collaboration both within and
between clinical research communities [18]. The sensitivity
and distributed nature of the clinical data drove the need to
find secure and effective ways of accessing and managing it.
The project was ultimately successful, but several problems
stymied the adoption of NeuroGrid in its targeted research
communities; these included failing to specifically address
usable security problems.
Although usability researchers had elicited requirements
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from a wide range of project stakeholders, many security
decisions with an implication on user interaction had been
made before their engagement. As a result, the usability
researchers felt they had little control over any design or
implementation decisions affecting the security architecture;
this meant there was little direct engagement with the team
responsible for building and maintaining NeuroGrid’s core se-
curity mechanisms. Because of this, when scientists expressed
problems using the Public Key Infrastructure during formative
evaluation activities, application developers were left with
the responsibility of addressing them. While simple interface
changes helped explain terms to non-specialists, as did writing
documentation to explain security controls, developers were
also left with the responsibility of implementing components
to manage users’ digital certificates on their behalf; this
effectively replaced digital certificates with passwords as an
authentication mechanism. Although this appeared to improve
user perception of authentication usability, the design and im-
plementation of these security components was not subject to
the same security evaluation criteria as the rest of the security
architecture, and, as such, the vulnerabilities associated with
it were largely unknown.
III. APPROACH
In this section, we describe how security and usability de-
sign activities were incorporated into the development process
of webinos. We begin by summarising the webinos project and
the motivations behind it, and then explain the development
process, before describing the security and usability design
activities in more detail.
A. About webinos
The webinos project was funded by the EU with a project
team drawn from 24 organisations across Europe, including
universities, mobile network providers, handset and automotive
manufacturers, mobile software houses, and market analysts.
The project ran from September 2010 to August 2013. The
primary objective was to develop a federated software platform
for running web applications consistently and securely across
mobile, PC, home media, and in-car systems. The webinos
platform provides a software runtime environment that allows
the discovery of devices and services based on technical and
contextual information. The platform also offers a set of APIs
providing access to cross-user, cross-service, and cross-device
functionality. More information about the webinos architecture
can be found at [35].
Because webinos applications can access physical and
informational resources across different devices, and this in-
formation may describe a user’s personal habits and prefer-
ences, managing access is a complex security and usability
design problem. Questions are also raised about the needs
of application developers who must request permissions for
their applications to access user data and provide facilities for
users to manage their security and privacy. This is exacerbated
by the lack of prior art and experience in cross-platform
and multi-device personal networking, especially given the
different physical and social contexts of use.
The large number of collaborating partners, the innovative
nature of the project, and the significant security concerns all
influenced the need to integrate security and usability design
techniques in the development process.
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1) The Design and Development process: A first version
of the webinos platform was publicly released in March 2012,
following an 18-month development effort that is summarised
in Figure 1.
A use-case driven approach was used to elicit and spec-
ify software requirements for the initial version of webinos.
During the first six months of development, over 80 use cases
were drafted and ranked by importance and novelty by the
project team. As the project scope became clearer, the number
of use cases were reduced to 33. These final use cases, and
the process used to create them is described in [33].
The use cases, along with an industry and software ecosys-
tem analysis, informed an up-front requirements elicitation
and specification activity for the webinos platform. In the
subsequent six months, these requirements informed the devel-
opment and architectural design of webinos, its APIs, and the
security and privacy frameworks. In the last six months, two
concurrent activities took place: platform development, and
development of a collection of concept apps. Both the platform
and concept apps were implemented via an agile model based
on the Scrum method [27], with sprints of approximately two
weeks. Scrum teams were created for representative webinos
platforms, with the core architectural components and features
developed being derived from the architectural design docu-
mentation. Insights from the implementation led to updates
to the use cases and requirements, which were delivered at
the same time as the platform. In parallel, based on the
API specifications, several concept apps were developed to
demonstrate webinos’ capabilities and provide feedback to
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platform developers.
2) The Usable Security design team: Security and us-
ability design activities were integrated into the design and
development process. These activities took place during the
project’s first two years, and were carried out by a team
of 10 practitioners and academics drawn from five different
organisations; this team included some of the authors of this
paper. Because the team was responsible for both security
and usability, the team would avoid the engagement problems
found on NeuroGrid.
The distributed nature of the team meant that on-going
progress was discussed in fortnightly telephone conferences
during the first year. Although all team members had an
information security background and an appreciation of the im-
portance of usability in the design process, only three had any
practical experience of applying usability design techniques to
a real project. For this reason, detailed guidelines and examples
of how to use the techniques were documented on a project
wiki, and time was set aside at each telephone conference for
answering questions about them. In the second year, telephone
conferences and meetings were less frequent, and multi-day
meetings were held during the project meetings that took place
throughout the year. In the remaining 18 months of the project,
the webinos platform was continually refined, with its source
code being released to the community as multiple open-source
projects [34].
B. Context of Use Analysis
To begin driving the project’s security and usability design
activities, the team created an adapted context of use descrip-
tion. This description, which is specified in [32], was used to
support the specification and architectural design of webinos by
capturing and modelling the security expectations of webinos
stakeholders.
Context of use descriptions describe the characteristics of a
system’s intended users, the tasks they are expected to perform,
and the environments a system is expected to operate in [16].
Although context of use descriptions were devised to support
formative and summative usability evaluation activities, the
team wanted to use this description to motivate and justify
security and usability design decisions; this would avoid issues
found in previous European security and privacy projects
where usability artifacts were disconnected from subsequent
design decisions. Because of this, the context of use description
developed for webinos was aligned with usability and secure
system design techniques and concepts in a number of different
ways, as summarised in Figure 2.
1) Users: In standard context of use descriptions, skills,
knowledge, and personal attributes are captured about primary
(direct) or secondary (indirect) users. To elicit and specify
information about users, a two-step approach was taken. First,
the project team considered the project scope and identified
two main categories of users that webinos should be designed
for (app developers and app end-users). Second, a collection
of 12 personas were developed to elicit and specify skills
and attributes of prospective users. Personas are specifications
or archetypical users that embody their goals and needs
[10]; these were selected as user representations because
previous work indicates that developing and applying them
can contribute positively to secure system design activities
[7]. To model user goals succinctly, the team structured the
data contributing to the characteristics of each persona; each
characteristic corresponded to an activity, aptitude, attitude,
motivation, or skill-related personal goal. This process is
described in more detail in [10].
2) Tasks: Tasks include attributes such as name, break-
down, frequency of use, duration, and physical and men-
tal demands. Although scenario-based task descriptions are
analogous to use cases, insufficient contextual information
was available to elicit task duration and demand information
from the use case template used for webinos, which was
based on [5]. Instead, a collection of 10 activity scenarios
[24] was created; these were written based on the project
team’s domain expertise and conjectured how the previously
developed personas might use the webinos platform. Using
both the narrative and the characteristics of each participating
persona, a table categorising scenario’s duration, frequency of
use, and physical and mental demands was completed for each
scenario.
3) Environments: Environments are not formally defined
by the context of use description, but are recognised as part of
a work system consisting of users, equipment, tasks, physical
and social environment, and the goals the work system needs
to achieve [6]. Conceptually, work systems are analogous
to contexts of use, so environments can be considered as
the social or physical surroundings within which webinos is
used. From a specification perspective, webinos assumes the
presence of a single physical environment, but everyone on the
project team viewed webinos differently depending on their
individual or organisational stake. To better understand how
webinos’ surroundings influenced its design, the team carried
out a domain modelling exercise of webinos to identify key
concepts in five functional areas and five target application
areas; functional areas included ’Development & Deployment’
and ’Media Consumption & Creation’, and target application
areas included ’Navigation’ and ’Home media and interactive
TV’. The key concepts and relationships were drawn from the
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Fig. 3. Posters of personas characteristics, goals, and expectations
scenarios and use cases, and modelled as UML class diagrams;
these included hardware, software, or service concepts of
importance which constrain or reference webinos.
4) Equipment: Equipment is concerned with the specifica-
tion of hardware, software, and services associated with the
system being designed. Specifying the context of use involves
describing, albeit in broad terms, how related systems, such as
applications and devices, interface with webinos. The domain
models described in Section III-B3 formed the basis of UML
class diagrams of architecturally significant assets. Each ‘asset
model’ diagram was based on a particular environment of inter-
est. Of the ten environments originally domain modelled, asset
models were based on three functional areas, and three target
application areas. Attributes in the class diagram were used
to describe the security (Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability,
Accountability) and privacy (Anonymity, Pseudonymity, Un-
linkability, Unobservability) properties of each asset.
5) Attackers: The context of use description helps identify
vulnerabilities arising from usability problems, but says little
about how these might be exploited. The team believed view-
ing such vulnerabilities from the perspective of an attacker
might provide additional insights into these problems, so a set
of 6 attacker personas were incorporated into the context of use
description. These were based on threat agents specified by the
OWASP project [20], and grounded in publicly available open
source intelligence. Attack trees [26] were created to visually
and systematically represent how these personas might launch
certain attacks. More information on how attacker personas
were created and used can be found in [1].
C. Building Security into the Architectural Design of
webinos
During the use case and requirement specification stage,
webinos was treated as a black box, the tasks and personas
within the context of use description served as a reminder of
the expectations of prospective users and application develop-
ers. To remind the project team about these expectations, A4
posters were created for each persona. These summarised the
key characteristics, goals, and expectations of each persona;
as illustrated in Figure 3, project partners were encouraged to
place these posters in prominent locations around their offices.
Informed by the use cases and context of use description
elements, Security and usability requirements were elicited and
specified along with the broader functional and non-functional
requirements. Later, the architectural design considered we-
binos as a white box, which allowed the team to perform a
detailed security analysis. New questions were raised about
user expectations at this stage; answering these required the
team to combine the security analysis with their previous
usability work.
The security analysis began by running a two-day partici-
patory risk analysis workshop; this drew on the team’s domain
and platform security expertise. The asset models developed
as part of the context of use description were updated based
on insights from the newly emerging webinos architecture.
The previously created context-specific asset models were
qualitatively rated based on their perceived security and privacy
properties. Sensitised by this analysis, the team identified sev-
eral new vulnerabilities, together with a number of attacks that
the attacker personas might carry out. Risks were identified
based on threats exploiting vulnerabilities in particular contexts
of use. To explore their human impact, each of the 12 risks
elicited were validated using a misuse case: a sequence of
actions that an attacker can perform which will cause harm to
stakeholders when the sequence is allowed to complete [29].
Although misuse cases are traditionally used to elicit risks,
using this approach for risk validation not only places the
risk in a human context, it also sanity-checks the analysis
contributing to the definition of each risk. The results of this
analysis were used to guide the design and evaluation of the
security architecture. For example, one misuse case described
an instance of fraud due to abuse of the webinos payment
API. In exploring how this misuse case might be possible,
several team members speculated that a native app developer
might find grappling with the JavaScript API difficult, leading
to concerns that security would be sacrificed if it steepened this
persona’s learning curve. Not only did this discussion help to
cement the importance of usability in the security of webinos,
but it also helped to reinterpret the webinos architecture and
support further analysis into how vulnerable code might be
developed. These risks and misuse cases are described in more
detail in [31].
D. Supporting Platform and Application Development
Although security and usability design activities did not
formally take place in the later stages of the project, the results
from the previous stages were used to support the on-going
platform and concept app development activities.
Several of the platform development decisions were mo-
tivated by the need to mitigate the previously defined misuse
cases. One of these described a persona (Justin) habitually
using a mobile broadband connection to install interesting
applications on his smartphone as part of his morning com-
mute. When installing a webinos-enabled diary application for
the first time, Justin confused some of the dialog controls
for setting up privacy preferences with those associated with
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exporting/importing data from one application to another.
Consequently, as a result of habituation, Justin unintention-
ally accepted privacy-invasive default settings defined by this
application’s developer. This led to discussions within the
development team about the application installation process
and the granting of access permissions. Personas and activity
scenarios were also useful for grounding developer discussion
when the lack of visibility of dependent applications and users
might have led to an inappropriate expansion of the webinos
runtime environment’s scope.
Concept app development was supported by directly apply-
ing the context of use description, particularly the personas,
to motivate application design decisions. One of these apps
was a travel game application called Kids in Focus where one
player using an in-car telematics system could play card games
with someone using a home media system. The game was
specifically design to support the in-car systems of a mother
(Helen) who wished to keep her young son entertained on a
long car journey, by talking and playing a card game with
his grandfather (Peter) who was at home. By encouraging
the developers to design specifically for the personas and
their contexts of use, it was possible to highlight which
controls were either necessary or unnecessary. For example,
this concept app was built using pre-existing components
that assumed authentication would be necessary. However,
application authentication would not be required because the
webinos platform had already verified the player identities
before commencing the game. As the mobile component of
the application would be used by a young child, a number
of privacy design considerations were identified during the
application design, such as whether it was appropriate to
switch game play to an ‘auto-pilot’ when connection to Peter
was lost. Thinking of both the young son and the security
and privacy asset values in the related environment helped
motivate the design decisions that were eventually made.
Similarly, defining the explicit elements of the context of use
made it easier for developers to identify what information and
resources would be required by the application, and whether
or not these conflicted with the privacy preferences of the
personas.
E. Releasing webinos Design Data
In addition to making the source code of webinos available
to the community, its specification and architectural design
have also been made available as public deliverables.1 How-
ever, to encourage take-up of webinos, the fine-grained design
data – upon which its architecture is based – was also released
with the source code to potential webinos users and developers.
In doing so, the intent was to equip the community with the
same data and tools that the project used to design and build
webinos. In addition to its software requirements, this design
data included XML models of the context of use specifications,
as well as the threat models used to evaluate the webinos
architecture’s security. This allows developers to carry out their
own risk analysis on later versions of webinos specifications,
to determine whether webinos meets their own security and
privacy expectations, as well as those of the personas in the
context of use description.
1These are downloadable from http://webinos.org
IV. DIFFICULTIES
While the approach taken was largely successful, it was not
entirely problem-free. Indeed, we would have been surprised
if the results had indicated otherwise. Because many of the
challenges faced were of a project management nature, we
have chosen to focus on four specific difficulties associated
with ‘designing in’ security and usability.
A. User research is not easy
To build the models described in Section III-B, it was
necessary to collect data about the people associated with
webinos, and their day-to-day activities. This data would also
be useful for security design because it reveals insights about
possible vulnerabilities associated with device interactions in
different contexts of use [11]. Despite this, the team faced
a significant challenge conducting the research necessary to
collect data directly from potential end-users. We believe there
were three main reasons for this difficulty.
First, because the team members did not have the resources
to undertake all the user research activities themselves, data
collection activities needed to be distributed among the whole
team. Unfortunately, not only was the team broadly unfamiliar
with usability design techniques and methodologies, they also
were not working on these design activities on a full-time basis.
Second, although some primary data was collected from
prospective developers as part of an industry landscape anal-
ysis conducted by a different webinos team member, this data
was collected via semi-structured interviews that were not
designed for eliciting security concerns. The only opportunity
to address this came at a late stage, and allowed the team to
include two very specific questions about how developers de-
sign their applications for security and privacy, however there
was no opportunity to follow-up on any interesting points.
Moreover, because detailed transcripts were not recorded by
the interviewers, only a very small number of security and
privacy developer perceptions were elicited from the 21 inter-
views conducted.
Third, there was little guidance about how primary security
data might be collected for the planned design activities.
Existing work on collecting primary data for security analysis
tends to focus on quantitative data from software and hardware
sources, rather than qualitative data from people. Further, such
data tends to be analysed to identify attackers, rather than to
identify behavioural patterns. Work by the Hackers Profiling
Project [4] describes a systematic approach for collecting
primary data about hackers and using this to develop profiles;
unfortunately, replicating this work would have been infeasible
given time constraints.
To overcome the problem of limited primary data, the team
tried to make the most of what data it had access to: both
making use of additional data sources to inform and justify
design decisions, and by reusing data it had collected for
other purposes in webinos. Some of the additional sources
of data used were interview and focus group reports from
prior research that were relevant to representative users, email
discussions between domain experts about archetypical users,
and online resources about representative user communities.
One of the main sources of reused data was the webinos design
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documentation as this contained implicit assumptions about
prospective webinos users from the project team itself, making
it a useful source of data from which the team could build
personas.
In order to address the danger of taking repurposed data
out of context, or introducing too much subjectivity into
derived artifacts, design rationale techniques were used to
justify explicitly any claims made. Because the amount of data
in the documentation was substantial, the process of building
personas from repurposed data was distributed among team
members. The first step was to identify factoids from the
design documentation, followed by affinity diagramming to
cluster these according to potential persona behaviour. Each
individual cluster formed the basis of a persona characteristic,
and each group of clusters formed the basis of an individual
persona. Each cluster was then structured systematically by
aligning each characteristic with a model of argumentation.
Each characteristic claim was built upon grounds, a warrant
connecting the grounds to the claim, a qualifier stating the
confidence in the claim being made, and any possible rebuttals
to the claim; this model is described in more detail in [10],
and proved extremely helpful in building useful design artifacts
from repurposed data.
B. Usability is not a priority
Even if webinos was a Research & Development project,
there was still underlying tension between the need for results
and the need for research. It was, therefore, inevitable that
usability design would clash with the design activities that they
were intended to support. When this did happen, the contention
led to some unexpected results, especially with respect to the
time taken to build the context of use artifacts. For example,
the team estimated that developing each persona would take
half to a full working day; this was based on the number of
data sources, and the time taken to both elicit factoids and carry
out affinity diagramming. The team had assumed that partners
would build each persona in a single sitting, because they knew
affinity diagramming was best undertaken when people were
most sensitised to the data, and building the argumentation
model and associated narrative text was comparatively quick.
What they found instead was that a number of personas were
completed over the course of one to two months. This led to
delays in specifying the activity scenarios and other dependent
context of use artifacts, and, as a result, delays in identifying
vulnerabilities that had not been found during the use case and
requirement elicitation activities.
It was also found that team members failed to appreciate
both the level of analysis necessary to cull factoids from the
data sources themselves, and the time that this would take.
Thus, as deadlines came closer, some team members identified
factoids based only on a superficial analysis of data, rather than
at the level of detail associated with a thorough qualitative data
analysis. In hindsight, this was understandable: although the
process of building personas was straightforward, the analysis
and sense-making activities were difficult to explain using
printed material and telephone conferences alone.
To give team members time to carry out the necessary data
analysis activities, provide feedback on their work, and appre-
ciate the contribution that the context of use description might
play, the team held a two-day workshop one month before the
context of use description delivery deadline. Preparing for the
workshop led to the team members ensuring that their work
was ready for validation. The event was also an opportunity
to demonstrate how vulnerabilities could be derived from
activity scenarios. After the experienced team members pre-
sented activity scenarios, and discussed possible vulnerabilities
arising from the personas interaction with webinos, the less
experienced team members became more confident and open
to identifying possible threats and vulnerabilities evident in
their own (and others’) work.
C. Technique misappropriation is easy
Detailed guidelines, examples, and references were pro-
vided for team-members to help apply the described security
and usability design techniques. Although these were written
with the limited usability expertise of team members in mind,
cases were still found where techniques were misappropriated
unintentionally.
When writing the guidelines for building personas, the team
explained that the purpose of the argumentation models was
to help other team members better understand how persona
characteristics were derived. Thus they were surprised that
rather than using these characteristics to decrease stereotypical
assumptions, some team members used them to achieve the op-
posite effect. In particular, they found that some personas were
built by first writing the persona narrative and then using the
argumentation models to justify assumptions that were made in
the narrative; this effectively bypassed the data elicitation and
affinity diagramming process altogether. These problematic
personas were only identified during later reviews because the
argumentation models used to underpin these personas were
noticeably weaker than those that had been properly built from
the data. In another case, a designer assumed that personas
could be created by simply writing a narrative describing the
expectations about a type of user he had in mind. When
reviewing one of the personas created by this designer, the
team drew attention to the fallacies underpinning several of
the persona’s characteristics, and walked through how the
technique — and the argumentation models in particular —
identified these fallacies, while also eliciting claims about the
persona.
D. Sustaining adoption through implementation requires cre-
ativity
Looking back on the project, the results of the security
and usability design activities showed some success. The
misuse cases helped validate the webinos security architecture
and, where these were not or only partially mitigated by the
security architecture, recommendations had been made about
how to address these. Almost all of these were only partially
mitigated because multiple measures would be necessary,
including the specification of more requirements before they
could be implemented, as well as making APIs explicitly
less permissive. For example, one automotive misuse case
described how an attacker persona, fulfilling the role of a car-
parking attendant, would be able to access music from another
persona’s devices by abusing the automatic login features
and weak policy controls set by that persona. The proposed
approach for dealing with this problem involved additional
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Fig. 4. Consolidated concept map of requirements
authentication controls, and removing access to capabilities
in automotive contexts where the team were confident that
personas would not need them. It was, therefore, evident to
those team members working on design activities that the
dialectic between usability and security artifacts helped guide
requirements elicitation and security design decisions.
While the team members continued to make use of this
work when the implementation started, the security and us-
ability design elements were noticeably less well used by
other members of the project. Consequently, although general
usability problems resulting from this analysis were addressed,
such as documenting webinos concepts for use by application
developers, usability problems with security mechanisms were
largely forgotten in the rush to implement the core webinos
architecture. This had two consequences.
First, many of the requirements associated with usable pol-
icy controls were made the responsibility of the development
team building concept apps. This meant that, in addition to
ongoing development work, they also needed to contend with
the usability design of context-specific access control policies.
For example, the Kids in Focus game was primarily created to
demonstrate a cross-device web application between different
collections of devices, because the young son played the game
using Helen’s tablet device, while Peter played using the TV
of his home-media system. In addition to demonstrating core
webinos functionality, the game was also designed to demon-
strate how conflicting privacy expectations might be managed.
In particular, the application could access device geolocation
data, to enable Peter to find out where Helen’s car was and how
long before her car reached its destination. However, Helen
was only prepared to disclose the time remaining and not her
car’s location. Unfortunately, because of time and resource
constraints, the concept app team did not consider policy
considerations a priority feature so, despite the importance
of security and privacy considerations in the platform, these
capabilities could not be demonstrated in the application’s
initial release.
To address this problem, team members provided a sup-
porting role during concept app development. This involved
providing advice on the security and privacy expectations
of the game’s users by describing how the personas might
use the applications, and applying known security usability
design guidelines [36] to indicate where authentication and
authorisation decisions would and would not be necessary.
Because there were continual discussions around the young
child’s interaction, the team decided to develop an additional
persona (Eric) for Helen’s five-year old son. The data ground-
ing this persona was derived from interviews with two webinos
team members with young children. While less empirically
grounded than the other personas, Eric proved invaluable
during team discussions because almost none of the other team
members were parents. The problem also subsequently led to
design research into how context-sensitivity could be incorpo-
rated into webinos’ access control framework. Arguably, the
ability to have carried out this work would not have been
possible had project team members not been engaged in the
creation and use of personas. More information about this work
can be found in [12].
Second, during the development of the core webinos archi-
tecture, vulnerabilities and threats that had been previously
identified and described in detail were forgotten and ‘re-
discovered’. Rather than review the work that had already
been carried out, developers tried to solve these problems
themselves, leading to sub-optimal implementation decisions.
For example, creating a secure storage system — to keep per-
sonal data and credentials confidential — was consistently re-
discovered by project members working on core functionality,
context-awareness and the security architecture. Authentication
requirements and solutions were also re-invented by concept
app developers despite early specification work on the main
system to solve the same problem.
The team dealt with this by identifying practical ways in
which the usability design results could help the on-going de-
velopment process without unduly impacting the implementa-
tion of core functionality. Time pressures meant that attempting
to directly interface usability design activities with the Scrum
practices would have been met with resistance. Therefore,
the team supported on-going activities these practices would
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need to be aligned with; one of these involved synchronising
the Scrum product backlog with the webinos requirements
specification. This synchronisation was made possible by the
release of the webinos design data described in Section III-E.
Although there is little evidence to suggest that external users
of webinos took advantage of the released data, the process of
making the data more open increased its visibility throughout
the project team.
To check whether important security and usability concerns
had been properly addressed, the team helped the developers
create concept maps [19] to make sense of the requirements
— their relevance and priorities — and the connections
between them and other design concepts. Each requirement
was characterised as a single concept relating to its goal, and
using pieces of paper for the requirement name and butcher
paper as a surface, spatially arranged and associated with
other concepts to infer the conceptual relationships between
them. The development team members carried out this activity
during project meetings when all team members were present
in the same location. The team members found the exercise so
useful that, despite other commitments, they decided to hold
a subsequent workshop three weeks later to consolidate the
requirements concept maps for each area; the consolidated
concept map is shown in Figure 4, and the process itself is
described in more detail in [13].
V. CONCLUSION AND LESSONS LEARNED
This paper described the difficulties faced designing se-
curity and usability into a non-trivial software system for a
research and development project. In doing so, we believe we
have presented the first study that shares insights, techniques,
and outcomes of building a secure and usable system from the
outset.
At first blush, many of the experiences described in Section
IV seem unsurprising. Quality is often sacrificed in the rush to
meet deadlines and, under such environments, latent conditions
inevitably arise; these lead to errors and violations that cause
the technique misappropriation problems described in Section
IV-C [23]. However, labelling these experiences as corollaries
of working on a risky project masks some potentially useful
lessons. We summarise four lessons learned that practitioners
can take away from our experiences designing and building
webinos.
A. Learn to work with sub-optimal data and expertise
Even when security and usability are pushed to the front
of a design process, it may be necessary to accept that
high quality empirical data may either be unavailable, or
not available in the quantity we would like. Moreover, the
expertise required for collecting and analysing this data might
not be readily available in climates where software is valued
over models. Rather than spurning design artifacts grounded
in reused, secondary, or assumption-based data, we need to
acknowledge that imperfect data plays a valid role in security
design. Moreover, as artifacts like personas become more
visible in general security design texts, e.g. [28], we need to
explore how design techniques can be better applied by non-
experts, and how these techniques can improve the quality and
presentation of the data we do have.
B. Security increases sensitivity to usability problems
Not only are security and usability both considered by
R&D teams as secondary goals when developing systems,
the qualities affecting security mechanisms are considered as
tertiary. Fortunately, a by-product of applying security and
usability design techniques together appears to be improved
sensitivity to usability problems associated with security mech-
anisms. Therefore, we should ensure that these design activities
are not carried out independently or are in tension with each
other, and a supportive environment is available for reflecting
on the interplay between security and usability values.
C. Designing for usability and security takes time
Personas, misuse cases, and attack trees may be the most
visible output of webinos’ usability and security design activi-
ties, but these cannot be created without intermediate design ar-
tifacts like affinity diagrams, and design rationale models. Not
only are these intermediate artifacts necessary, designers also
need time for self-reflection when building and applying them
in security contexts. This is particularly important given the
increasing use of security and usability research where agile
and lightweight techniques are used, and where collaborating
engineers are encouraged to fake process and focus on a final
product [21]. While security and usability design techniques
help to solve problems, designers also need to add their own
expertise and understanding. As such, we would argue that we,
as a community, need to extoll the virtues of critical thinking
as a design tool, rather than relying exclusively on methods as
a panacea.
D. Design research is a key element of designing of usability
and security
As the work described in [12], [13] shows in more detail,
security and usability design problems often require creative
solutions. This study has shown that integrating usability
design practices into a project at an early stage, and sensitising
team members to some of the techniques necessary to carry out
this research, lays the groundwork for carrying out the research
necessary for identifying the causes, rather than the symptoms,
of design problems as and when they arise. Moreover, as
the results of the concept mapping exercise illustrated, such
research also engages developers towards tackling their own
design problems, while simultaneously sensitising them to the
security and usability issues associated with them.
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